The European Project STRUCTURES : Challenges and Results by Beek, Stefan van de et al.
	



	




	

	
				
 !
	

∀#∃	#%
#&


∋(!()∗! (++  #%
#	
,+−
	
.,/∗.0
1
2	∃30∃3∋	4
0	
−∋	3
−	5	6,0730
.#/∗4		
∃6−
−

8∃1034940%4000#+∗(4∃∀8+ :(() ++(∗(:
	


	
	
	;	

				

Αυτηορ ποστ−πριντ 
 
Τηε Ευροπεαν Προϕεχτ ΣΤΡΥΧΤΥΡΕΣ: Χηαλλενγεσ ανδ Ρεσυλτσ 
Σ. ϖαν δε Βεεκ
1
, ϑ. Φ. ∆αωσον
2
, Λ. ∆αωσον
2
, Ι. ∆. Φλιντοφτ
2
, Η. Γαρβε
3
, Φ. Λεφερινκ
4
, Β. Μενσσεν
3
, Ν. Μορα
5
, 
Φ. Ραχηιδι
5
, Μ. Ριγηερο
6
, Μ. Ρυβινστειν
7
 ανδ Μ. Στοϕιλοϖιχ
7
 
 
1
Υνιϖερσιτψ οφ Τωεντε, Ενσχηεδε, Τηε Νετηερλανδσ 
2
Υνιϖερσιτψ οφ Ψορκ, Ψορκ, ΥΚ 
3
Λειβνιζ Υνιϖερσιτατ Ηαννοϖερ, Γερµανψ 
4
Τηαλεσ Νεδερλανδ Β.ς., Ηενγελο, Τηε Νετηερλανδσ 
5
Σωισσ Φεδεραλ Ινστιτυτε οφ Τεχηνολογψ (ΕΠΦΛ), Λαυσαννε, Σωιτζερλανδ 
6
Ιστιτυτο Συπεριορε Μαριο Βοελλα, Τορινο, Ιταλψ 
7Υνιϖερσιτψ οφ Αππλιεδ Σχιενχεσ ανδ Αρτσ Ωεστερν Σωιτζερλανδ, Ψϖερδον↑λεσ↑Βαινσ, Σωιτζερλανδ 
 
Πυβλισηεδ ατ τηε 2015 ΙΕΕΕ Ιντερνατιοναλ Σψµποσιυµ ον Ελεχτροµαγνετιχ Χοµπατιβιλιτψ (ΕΜΧ), ∆ρεσδεν, 
Γερµανψ, 16−22 Αυγ., 2015, ππ. 1095−1100. 
 
∆ΟΙ: 10.1109/ΙΣΕΜΧ.2015.7256321 
 
♥ 2015 ΙΕΕΕ. Περσοναλ υσε οφ τηισ µατεριαλ ισ περµιττεδ. Περµισσιον φροµ ΙΕΕΕ µυστ βε οβταινεδ φορ αλλ 
οτηερ υσεσ, ιν ανψ χυρρεντ ορ φυτυρε µεδια, ινχλυδινγ ρεπριντινγ/ρεπυβλισηινγ τηισ µατεριαλ φορ αδϖερτισινγ ορ 
προµοτιοναλ πυρποσεσ, χρεατινγ νεω χολλεχτιϖε ωορκσ, φορ ρεσαλε ορ ρεδιστριβυτιον το σερϖερσ ορ λιστσ, ορ ρευσε 
οφ ανψ χοπψριγητεδ χοµπονεντ οφ τηισ ωορκ ιν οτηερ ωορκσ. 
 
The European Project STRUCTURES:
Challenges and Results
Stefan van de Beek , John Dawson, Linda Dawson, Ian Flintoft,
Heyno Garbe , Frank Leferink, Benjamin Menssen , Nicolas Mora,
Farhad Rachidi, Marco Righero, Marcos Rubinstein , and Mirjana Stojilovi c´ 
University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands, g.s.vandebeek, f.leferink@utwente.nl
University of York, York, United Kingdom, l.dawson, john.dawson, ian.flintoft@york.ac.uk
Leibniz Universita¨t Hannover, Germany, menssen, garbe@geml.uni-hannover.de
Thales Nederland B.V., Hengelo, The Netherlands
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (EPFL), Lausanne, Switzerland, nicolas.mora, farhad.rachidi@epfl.ch
Istituto Superiore Mario Boella, Torino, Italy, righero@ismb.it
University of Applied Sciences and Arts Western Switzerland, Yverdon-les-Bains, Switzerland,
marcos.rubinstein, mirjana.stojilovic@heig-vd.ch
Abstract—The project STRUCTURES, funded by the Euro-
pean Union, started in July 2012 to study problems related
to the emerging threats of electromagnetic attacks to critical
infrastructures. Partners of the team have worked to list possible
threats, identify the main characteristics of the critical infras-
tructures our way of living depends on, test current protection
strategies with different simulation and measurement techniques,
and condensate the results in guidelines accessible to an audience
wider than the one of people working in the field. Here, we
summarize the challenges, the solutions, and the results of almost
three years of work.
I. INTRODUCTION
The continuous and coordinated performance of a set of
infrastructures is crucial for the security and quality of life
in industrialized countries. These critical infrastructures (CIs)
include electrical energy distribution networks, communication
networks, transportation networks such as railways, motor-
ways and airways, law enforcement structures, and public
health facilities. Their growing interdependency increases even
more their vulnerability to external attacks aimed at interrupt-
ing some of their services.
In recent years, the threat of reducing the functionality
of such infrastructures using electromagnetic fields to jam,
damage, or shut down the electric and electronic systems
instrumental to their good performance has become more and
more effective [1], [2].
The European Commission opened a call in the context
of the overall FP7 Security Call SEC-2011.2.2-2 Protection
of Critical Infrastructure (structures, platform and networks)
against Electromagnetic (High Power Microwave (HPM)) At-
tacks, to investigate such threats. The diversity of structures to
be considered, the intrinsic complexity of the electromagnetic
phenomena, the plethora of existing (and foreseen) attacks, the
numerous and different issues to be studied (modelling of the
attacks, design of sensors, design of shielding, etc.) required
a multi-disciplinary approach from highly skilled partners.
The project STRUCTURES started the 1st of July 2012 to
address the call.
The project is split into three main phases, with a managing
and a dissemination work package (WP) running along the
whole duration [3]–[5].
In the first phase, presented in Section II, the simulation
tools were adapted and the most significant points to be
studied were identified. In particular, in the physical scenario
assessment part, we conducted an extensive literature review
to identify and classify possible electromagnetic threats and
possible targets, highlighting their most prominent character-
istics. In the analysis scenario assessment part, we explored
the available simulation tools and how they can interact with
each other to model the relevant scenarios identified in the
previous part.
In the second phase, to which Section III is devoted, we
conducted the actual analysis and design work. In the risk
investigation and protection part, the archetypal models of
critical infrastructures and IEMI threats devised in the physical
scenario assessment were simulated using the computational
chains identified in the analysis scenario assessment. Important
susceptible items were experimentally characterized. Current
protection strategies were tested. Using the results of this
analysis, we propose some possible improvement of protec-
tion. In the Awareness part, we designed a sensor for real-
time detection of IEMI attacks and an embedded system for
identification and localisation of the source.
The third phase, described in Section IV, collects the
results and processes them to define a series of guidelines
for technicians and caveats for policy makers.
The diagram in Figure 1 shows the division of the activities
across the different work packages.
II. PHASE I
A. Physical scenario assessment
For a complete physical scenario assessment it is necessary
to analyze both the IEMI threat (the electromagnetic source)
and the victim (the critical infrastructure). The physical sce-
nario assessment is subdivided into two work packages:
Fig. 1. Schematics of the work packages division in the project STRUC-
TURES.
	 WP 2—IEMI threat analysis, and
	 WP 3—Review and analysis of critical infrastructures.
In WP 2, we started by collecting a list of possible sources
of an electromagnetic attack available from literature. The
focus within STRUCTURES is on sources capable of creating
high power electromagnetics (HPEM). HPEM is defined in [6]
as: “the general area of technology involved in producing
intense electromagnetic radiated fields or conducted voltages
and currents which have the capability to damage or upset
electronic systems. Generally, the disturbance exceeds those
produced under normal conditions (e.g. 100 V/m and 100 V).”
In total, we collected information on 65 sources, both radiated
and conducted [2]. The sources are classified by technical
attributes, e.g., frequency content [7], peak electric field or
peak voltage, and pulse repetition frequency. The generation
and propagation of HPEM is fundamentally limited by physi-
cal constraints, such as electric breakdown. These limitations
were analysed for different types of sources. To estimate the
risk potential of an RF source, it is not sufficient to only take
technical attributes into account [8]. Non-technical attributes
should also be used to classify the likelihood of the occurrence
of an attack with a certain RF source. For this reason, all
analysed RF sources were classified by the following non-
technical attributes:
	 Source technology: Sources can be classified by the
technical sophistication level in assembling and deploying
such systems. As described in [9], classification is based
on three different levels: low-tech, medium-tech, and
high-tech generator systems.
	 Portability: The portability of the sources is subdivided
into four different levels as described in [10]: pocket-
sized, briefcase-sized, motor-vehicle sized, and trailer-
sized.
	 Availability: Measure of both cost and the technological
sophistication as described in [10]. Four levels are de-
fined, ranging from low availability to high availability.
The main objective of WP 3 was the identification, review,
and analysis of critical infrastructures. Within STRUCTURES,
we focused on six different CIs:
1) Power plant,
2) Communication exchange,
3) Transport based on train,
4) Bank/financial office,
5) Airport, and
6) Computer network.
The listed infrastructures are highly complex and increasingly
reliant on electronic systems. To keep the complexity manage-
able, a reference configuration was derived for each infrastruc-
ture and the critical subsystems and components were identi-
fied [11]. A literature review, which addresses several EMC
aspects relevant to critical infrastructures, was performed.
First of all, past experience with IEMI effects was listed to
analyse the susceptibility issues with these events. Further-
more, existing protection and mitigation concepts against IEMI
interferences are summarized. The electromagnetic features of
shielding, cable screening, filters, surge protection devices, and
others are addressed. Finally, the susceptibility thresholds of
relevant electronic components and subsystems available from
the literature were analysed and documented.
Another important aspect of WP 3 was the Business
Continuity Management (BCM) approach, as defined in the
ISO standards starting from ISO 22301 [12]. The theoretical
approach was presented and the actual situation was assessed
using a questionnaire distributed among selected critical infras-
tructure organizations. Awareness about IEMI attacks appears
to be underestimated by the organizations due to the lack of
the experience with IEMI effects. Hence, the lessons learned
will help to set up guidelines and methodologies in Phase III
of the project.
B. Analysis scenario assessment
In order to perform approximate analyses of the response
of complex systems, the Electromagnetic Topology (EMT)
concepts [13]–[15] have played a key role since they permit
dividing a complicated chain of EM interaction events into a
number of simpler parts. Within an EMT-based analysis, the
response of a system is obtained by considering independently
all the interaction problems that occur; starting from the
knowledge of the incident field and ending with the internal
component response [16]. Civil infrastructures like office
buildings or commercial infrastructures without any special
EMC requirement (e.g. communications grounding systems,
or similar) are typically designed without an EM topological
division of zones. This complicates the decomposition of
critical infrastructures into topological layers since they are not
very well defined. Also, many of the EM hardening concepts
can be violated.
Given the complexity of the problems under study in this
project, in the first part of WP 4 a simulation policy was
defined in which the main simulation task is decomposed into
simpler calculation objectives and all the results are combined
to retrieve the total response. The adopted workflow for the
numerical analysis process was defined as follows:
	 The reference geometry of the case under study is defined
and the susceptible equipment and their position inside
the CI are located. The possible IEMI sources and their
possible positions with respect to the CI are listed.
	 A topological analysis of the reference configurations is
performed to identify the relevant coupling paths between
the source positions and the susceptible equipment.
	 Each coupling path is decomposed into simpler transfer
functions that will be modelled with appropriate numer-
ical or analytical methods depending on the physical
nature and complexity of the problem under study [17]–
[20]. The transfer functions are cascaded together to ob-
tain an overall result. In order to overcome the difficulties
imposed by the uncertainty in some of the real scenarios,
the method in [21] has been used to perform parametric
simulations with less computational effort.
	 Finally, a suitable safety margin is defined and applied
in the evaluation of the interference risk, to take into
account the reduced accuracy of the model. To assess the
risk, the susceptibility thresholds (field, power, voltage,
or current levels) of the critical equipment with respect
to the different IEMI threats are assumed to be known.
A typical simulation problem includes the simulation of
the fields generated by a given source, its propagation in
an outdoor environment, the penetration of the fields into
buildings through critical apertures, conductive penetrations
or wall diffusion, and the indoor field distribution calculation.
Once the indoor fields are calculated, a direct illumination
of the susceptible equipment can be considered, or an indirect
coupling to the equipment through its communication or power
lines due to the field-to-wire coupling can also be studied. One
of the major challenges in building realistic models of CIs is
the determination of the high frequency characteristics of the
constitutive materials of windows, cables, and polymers for
which very little information is available in the literature or
for which no simulation experience has been reported. Some
parts of the experimental characterization campaigns of WP 5
and WP 6 were aimed at fine tuning the simulation models
or at validating the accuracy of the adopted approximations in
the calculation of the simplified transfer functions [22]. In the
case of cable simulations, the input impedances of the commu-
nication circuits and power sources of the critical equipment
are required for loading the MTL models and calculating the
voltage and current transfer functions. A method to retrieve the
differential input impedance of the communication and power
ports of critical equipment with the aid of a two-port VNA
was presented in [23].
At higher IEMI frequencies (above about 1 GHz), coupling
to cables can only be considered statistically due to the
uncontrolled variations in cable bundles and critically in the
connection interface geometries. Since Ethernet cables are a
critical component in many CI scenarios which depend on
IT equipment, empirical data on the statistical variation of
Ethernet cable and connector transfer functions were collected
from 200 MHz to 6 GHz using reverberation chamber mea-
surements. Transfer function envelopes were derived from the
measurement data for use in WP 7.
III. PHASE II
A. Risk investigation and protection
The risk analyses of the six types of infrastructures listed in
Section II-A have been performed in WP 7 by using the agreed
workflow. For each case, a reference configuration, including
3D CAD files and a list of critical equipment under study,
and the appropriate numerical methods for its simulation have
been elaborated by the consortium partners.
For example, the chosen reference configuration for the
communication exchange infrastructure is a TETRA station,
for which the susceptibility thresholds and other useful in-
formation were provided in WP 6 [24]–[26]. The simulation
setup is illustrated in Figure 2. The equipment is mounted
on an outdoor structure (mounting pole) typically built with
metal and located above the ground. The critical equipment
inside the base-stations consists of RF receivers connected
to monopole antennas through RG214 coaxial cables, GPS
receivers connected to the GPS antenna through RG58 coaxial
cables, and network cards connected to the service box through
Ethernet cables. The mounting pole is illuminated with a plane
wave arriving from several possible directions. The transfer
functions between the amplitude of the illuminating field and
the induced voltage and current at the input of the receivers
have been numerically calculated with a computational chain
composed of time domain and frequency domain full wave
methods for the field distribution and antenna coupling cal-
culations, and MTL plus circuit codes for the field-to-wire
coupling and propagation to the loads. The input impedance
and the transfer functions of the front-end filters and the net-
work equipment were previously obtained in the experimental
campaigns of WP 6.
Another reference configuration for a transport infrastruc-
ture considered front-door coupling to the communication
antennas on a train. The configuration is shown schematically
in Figure 3. In Levels 2 of the European Train Control
System (ETCS) both a GSM-R radio link and the fixed data
balises are used in the signaling control loop between the
signaling control centre and on-board computer (EVC). The
balises operate as location markers to allow the train EVC to
determine the train location which is then sent to the signaling
control centre via a GSM-R radio link. Movement authority
is then returned to the EVC by the GSM-R link. The critical
equipment is the receiver front-ends in the GSM-R receivers
and balise antenna units. The loop antennas system used by
the balise may also offer an out-of-band attack front-door on
the on-board computer system. The system is illuminated by
plane-waves from various directions and by dipole antennas
located in the passenger compartment of the train to yield
transfer functions between IEMI source amplitudes and re-
ceived voltage. The computational chain uses full-wave FDTD
simulations of the train coupled with MoM models of the
GSM-R and balise antennas. In this case, the receiver input
impedance and susceptibility profiles are obtained from the
literature.
Data from the analysis of the six archetypal CIs are used for
the following WP 8. The aim of WP 8 is to identify strategies
and means of improving current protection levels for CIs. To
this end, the work package is broken down into three tasks
which provide a structured approach to the work. The first task
is to define the protection levels which are required to mitigate
the potential IEMI threat. The results of WP 6 and WP 7 are
being used to define the protection level requirements (e.g.,
current level, voltage level, field level, frequency range) for the
components of each critical infrastructure. The possible need
for protection is being derived from the probability of failure
of critical systems when subjected to the IEMI effects in the
larger context of its relation with other components within the
infrastructure containing the system of concern. The second
task is a study of the protection technologies and strategies that
can be used to achieve the desired protection levels specified
in the first task. Specific protection strategies (hardware and
software) are being applied for front-door and back-door IEMI
attacks, which can be either conducted or radiated. Passive
EM hardware protection techniques applied to the system
of concern (e.g., filtering, shielding, SPDs, system layout)
are being considered along with the integration of innovative
active hardening measures (e.g., frequency selective surfaces
in radomes, smart antennas). Special attention is being given to
the fact that good coordination between hardware and software
hardening (e.g., error detection codes, fault diagnosis, error
recovery) must be achieved, as well as the fact that an upgrade
of available traditional protective devices may be needed (e.g.,
parasitic effects in SPDs). The third task is an evaluation of
the effectiveness of the proposed protection strategies and tech-
nologies through modeling, case simulations, and laboratory
measurements. For the analysis, test cases defined in WP 7 will
be used, considering both conducted and radiated scenarios.
The cost and relevance will be considered to evaluate the
convenience of the protection technologies and strategies.
B. Awareness
A failure of an electronic component or system due to IEMI
may be blamed on faulty hardware or software, and much time
and money may be wasted on searching for the cause, partic-
ularly if the failure is intermittent. It is therefore beneficial to
consider how IEMI attacks may be detected. The three most
important requirements for the detection system are the ability
to detect an IEMI attack and generate an alarm, to send the
received data for logging and post-processing, and to be cost-
efficient. We have developed a low cost system that achieves
these requirements [27], [28]. Additional features, such as
locating and/or identifying the source of the attack, require
designing a significantly more complex system, which is thus
likely to be more expensive. However, in some applications,
these features may be required, so we have also developed
an IEMI detection system with location and identification
Fig. 2. Schematic diagram of the communication infrastructure. Image
adapted from [24].
Fig. 3. Schematic diagram of the rail infrastructure reference case. Front-door
coupling between IEMI sources at trackside and on the train to the onboard
GSM-R and balise antenna units have been considered.
capabilities [29], [30]. This has been done as part of WP 9.
The low cost detector system uses a simple diode detector
with a logarithmic amplifier and peak hold, sampled by a mi-
crocontroller, see Figure 4. It has a fibre-optic communications
link to a monitoring station. It can detect CW signals over
the frequency range 100 MHz to 6 GHz with a sensitivity
better than 10 V/m. For short pulsed signals, the detector is
less sensitive but able to detect signals of about 200 V/m for
pulse widths of about 250 ps. A conducted IEMI sensor is
also being developed. The design is capable of operating with
a low power consumption so that it may be solar powered if
used outside and will operate off internal batteries for a period
of days in case of power loss.
When the design of the IEMI location and identification
system started, a number of different localisation algorithms
were analyzed to compare their applicability to locating IEMI
sources. Most of them were found to have limitations due to
the broad bandwidth, fast pulse-widths, and high directivity
of IEMI sources. The time difference of arrival (TDoA)
Fig. 4. The low cost IEMI detector prototype under test with double
exponential pulse generator at Rheinmetal test facility Unterleuss.
algorithm was estimated the best [29]. This algorithm requires
a relatively small number of simple sensors to calculate the
source location from the difference in arrival time of the
emitted pulse at each sensor. Due to high directivity of many
IEMI sources, the sensors should be distributed around the
periphery of an installation to be protected (Figure 5).
The IEMI location and identification system uses a novel
one-bit digitisation method, allowing efficient identification
of the type of source waveform [30]. The device is modular
(Figure 6). It is designed to accept up to five EM-field sensors,
e.g., D-dot sensors SFE3-5G from Montena Technology SA.
The main components of the device are the sensor boards,
one for every sensor, the interface board, and the FPGA
signal-processing board. The sensor boards are analog inter-
face boards, designed to accept sharp voltage impulses or
oscillatory signals, estimate their amplitude, and perform one-
bit digitization. The interface board collects digital data from
all sensor boards and passes it to the Xilinx FPGA Kintex-
7 Evaluation board. The FPGA is programmed to perform
attack detection and data preprocessing. At the same time, the
evaluation board is connected to a PC, for which a special
software to collect the information on the attack, estimate
the source location and type, and control and tune the device
operation is developed. The system is currently under test.
IV. PHASE III
A. Guidelines and methodologies for IEMI protection
WP 10 will use the outputs and results of the previous work
packages to provide a set of documents targeted at different
audiences. The first document will be aimed at policy makers
and standards bodies. It will recommend an assessment system
which is based on a standard safety risk assessment approach
to IEMI. The issues considered will include:
	 Likelihood and severity of adverse consequences.
	 Application of a suitably calibrated matrix and severity
scale.
	 Assessment of risk tolerability.
Fig. 5. An example scenario of the IEMI attack. The victim equipment
is inside a building of length 
 and width . A set of EM field sensors,
marked in green, is distributed around the building. The separation between
the building and the sensors is at least  and between the sensors and the
fence at least . An IEMI source, marked in red, is somewhere outside the
protected area [29].
Fig. 6. The IEMI location and identification system block diagram. The
device is modular, composed of a set of sensor boards, an interface board, and
a high-speed signal-processing FPGA board. The control and the monitoring
of the device operation is done via a PC. Additionally, the PC is used for
displaying the location of the source and the estimated waveforms of the
attack signals.
	 Assessment of accessibility.
	 Any other factors that may affect the vulnerability of the
infrastructure.
The companion disciplines of and standards for CI protection
such as the “Business Continuity Management” approach, the
ICT standards for Security Techniques, etc., will be considered
to situate the guidelines in a larger existing framework regard-
ing CIs. Non-technical mitigation actions will be included as
will a consolidated summary of applicable standards together
with an assessment of the standards and recommendations for
standards bodies. The second document will give guidelines
and recommendations for the detection of IEMI for an au-
dience of engineers and policy makers based on the outputs
from WP 9. The third document will be a technical summary
of protection methods for engineers and standards bodies and
will provide advice on where improvements to these could
be made. The final document will include information on
computational and experimental methods which may be used
to provide some of the information used as input to the risk
assessment. Guidance on how to use the data obtained from
any modeling and experiments will be included, as will some
examples of coupling data. The audience for this document
is expected to be engineers charged with providing the input
to the risk assessment. It may also be of interest to standards
making bodies for the measurement techniques.
V. CONCLUSION
A brief account of the European project STRUCTURES
is given. With the aim of investigating the emerging threats
of high-power electromagnetic interference against critical
infrastructures at the base of our way of living, the partners
of the project have developed a cross-disciplinary approach,
facing different aspects of the problem.
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